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POLICING, DATABASES, AND SURVEILLANCE:
FIVE REGULATORY CATEGORIES
Christopher Slobogin *
Databases are full of personal information that law
enforcement might find useful. Government access to these
databases can be divided into five categories: suspectdriven; profile-driven; event-driven; program-driven and
volunteer-driven. This chapter recommends that, in addition
to any restrictions imposed by the Fourth Amendment (which
currently are minimal), each type of access should be subject
to its own regulatory regime. Suspect-driven access should
depend on justification proportionate to the intrusion.
Profile-driven access should likewise abide by a
proportionality principle but should also be subject to
transparency, vetting, and universality restrictions. Eventdriven access should be cabined by the time and place of the
event. Program-driven access should be authorized by
legislation and by regulations publicly arrived-at and evenly
applied. Information maintained by institutional fiduciaries
should not be volunteered unless necessary to forestall an
ongoing or imminent serious wrong.
INTRODUCTION
It is now a commonplace that virtually everything we do is
memorialized on databases, some of them maintained by government, some
of them in the hands of private enterprises. These databases—which for
ease of reference this chapter will refer to as The Cloud—reside in the
servers of Google, Netflix and Apple; the memory banks of phones, closedcircuit cameras, “smart cars,” and satellites; and the computers in
government agencies and commercial establishments. They track an
astonishing range of our intimate daily activities, including Internet usage,
communications connections, financial transactions, travel routes, tax
information, medical treatment, and biometric information, as well as more
prosaic matters such as employment and residence history, utility usage,
*

Milton Underwood Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. A version of this paper
was published in the National Constitution Center’s White Paper Series, as Policing and
the Cloud, available at constitutioncenter.org.
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and car malfunctions. The question addressed here is when the government
should be able to gain access to this wealth of personal information for law
enforcement and national-security purposes.
In the United States, answering that question requires consulting a
welter of statutes and a few Supreme Court decisions. For instance, when
the government wants to access communications stored on a computer,
federal and state laws usually require a warrant, issued by a judge who has
found probable cause that the communication will lead to evidence of
wrongdoing. 1 However, if officials want an opened message that is sitting
on a server, or an unopened text that has been on a server for over 180 days,
then they may only need to show that it is “relevant” to an investigation—a
much lower standard than probable cause, albeit an assertion that at some
point is challengeable by the target, as occurs with an ordinary subpoena. 2
And if the communication sits on a “private” server (belonging, say, to an
employer), no court process is required. 3
When law enforcement officials seek records from third parties outside
the communications context, a wide array of statutes may be applicable. As
a general matter, bank, educational, and even medical records can be
obtained with a mere subpoena, which the target often does not find out
about unless and until prosecution occurs. 4 In a host of other situations,
such as accessing commercial camera footage or obtaining data about
credit-card purchases or past travel routes, most jurisdictions do not require
police to follow any judicial process, but rather allow them to obtain the
information at their discretion and that of the data holders. 5 When law
enforcement seeks information from the databases of other government
agencies, as opposed to those maintained by private entities, usually all it
needs is a written request from the head of the enforcement agency,
although sometimes more is required. 6
In theory, the U.S. Constitution, and in particular, the Fourth
Amendment, could have something to say about all of this. The Fourth
Amendment requires that the government act reasonably when it engages in
a “search” or “seizure,” and the courts have held that, for many types of
1

See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511 & 2518.
18 U.S.C. § 2703(a), (b)(1)(B). On February 9, 2017, the House of Representatives
unanimously voted to repeal this provision and instead require a warrant; the Senate had
yet to vote at the time of this writing.
3
18 U.S.C. § 2711(2) (defining remote computing service).
4
For a summary, see CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW
GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 174–75 (2007).
5
See generally Erin Murphy, The Politics of Privacy in the Criminal Justice System:
Information Disclosure, the Fourth Amendment, and Statutory Law Enforcement
Exemptions, 111 MICH. L. REV. 485 (2013).
6
See SLOBOGIN, supra note 4, at 173 (describing the Privacy Act).
2
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searches, this reasonableness requirement can only be met with a warrant.
However, this requirement only applies to government actions that are
considered “searches.” The Supreme Court has defined that word very
narrowly, to encompass only those actions that infringe “reasonable
expectations of privacy” or that involve some type of physical intrusion. 7
Most relevant here are the Court’s decisions holding that expecting
constitutional protection from government acquisition of information
surrendered to third parties—whether they be Internet service providers,
banks, or phone companies—is not reasonable, since we “assume the risk”
that those third parties will decide to give that information to the
government. 8 As discussed below, this “third party” doctrine has seen some
erosion in recent years, but it remains the reason that, other than when
access to the content of communications is involved, 9 the Fourth
Amendment has had very little impact on the government’s ability to obtain
information from private databases, even when it relies on technology to do
so.
When instead the database is created by law enforcement, the
Constitution may have more impact. In particular, collection of the
information for the database may require justification. For instance, taking a
DNA sample through a cheek swab is a Fourth Amendment search, 10 and
forcing an individual to produce self-incriminating documents can implicate
the Fifth Amendment unless the government can identify relatively
precisely the documents it wants. 11 However, any important regulatory need
will overcome Fourth Amendment claims that these types of data
acquisition are unreasonable; in such cases, probable cause is not
necessary. 12 And if the information is “nontestimonial” (as is assumed to be
the case with fingerprints and DNA 13), or is “voluntarily” surrendered for
non-criminal purposes (as is assumed to be the case with a tax return or

7
Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) (indicating that the expectation of
privacy test established in earlier case law is supplemented by inquiry into whether the
government “engage[s] in [a] physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area”).
8
See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (holding one has no
expectation of privacy in bank records, “even if the information is revealed on the
assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the
third party will not be betrayed”); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (same
holding with respect to phone numbers dialed).
9
See, e.g., United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment requires a warrant to obtain stored emails).
10
See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1969–70 (2013).
11
See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 45 (2000).
12
See, e.g., King, 133 S. Ct. at 1977 (holding that the government’s need for DNA
from arrestees outweighs the intrusion involved).
13
See, e.g., Wilson v. Collins, 517 F.3d 421, 431 (6th Cir. 2008).
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applications for government entitlements 14), or is obtained from a source
other than individual, the Fifth Amendment doesn’t apply. Finally, the
Constitution appears to have little to say about law enforcement agencies’
access to the information once they or other government entities
legitimately collect it. 15
While many have criticized the laxness of both statutory and
constitutional law, the most popular counter-proposal—that all or most
Cloud access by the government should require a judicial warrant—has
problems of its own. Conceptually, a warrant requirement glosses over the
intuition that a large number of situations, while involving a viable privacy
claim against the government, do not merit the full protection of a judicial
probable-cause finding. Practically, it would handcuff legitimate
government efforts to nab terrorists and criminals. A more nuanced
approach is probably necessary.
That approach should begin with an assessment of the varying
motivations that drive the government’s use of The Cloud. Cloud-based
searches can come in at least five different guises: suspect-driven, profiledriven, event-driven, program-driven, or volunteer-driven. Some database
access by the state is aimed at getting as much information as possible about
individuals suspected of wrongdoing. Other efforts do not start with a
particular suspect, but rather with a profile of a hypothetical suspect,
purportedly depicting the characteristics of those who have committed or
will commit a particular sort of crime. A third type of Cloud-search starts
neither with a suspect nor a suspect profile but with an event—usually a
crime—and tries to figure out, through location and related information,
who might be involved. Fourth, so as to have the information needed for
suspect-, profile-, and event-driven operations at the ready, government
might initiate data-collection programs. Finally, the government also relies
on citizens to come forward on their accord when they find incriminating
information about another person in The Cloud.

14

See, e.g., Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 657–58 (1976) (holding that the
federal penalty for failing to file a tax return does not coerce answers to individual
questions on the return, which the taxpayer can answer by asserting the privilege with
impunity); Balt. Dep’t of Soc. Serv. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 556 (1990) (stating that
“the Fifth Amendment privilege may not be invoked to resist compliance with a regulatory
regime constructed to effect the State’s public purposes unrelated to the enforcement of its
criminal laws”).
15
See Erin Murphy, DNA in the Criminal Justice System: A Congressional Research
Service Report, 64 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 340, 364 (2016) (noting that even with
respect to accessing genetic databases that can contain extremely personal information,
“[s]tandards surrounding the legality of both [on-demand and volunteered] disclosure have
not yet been fully adjudicated in the courts”).
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Each of these endeavors is distinct from the other four. Each calls for a
different regulatory regime. Below is a sketch of what those regimes might
look like. While they borrow from Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the
principles developed here fill a void because, to date, that jurisprudence has
had little to say about Cloud searches. Until the courts weigh in more
definitively, policymakers are working pretty much on a clean slate in this
area.
I. SUSPECT-DRIVEN CLOUD ACCESS-PROPORTIONALITY
Assume the police receive an anonymous phone call from a female
claiming that John Slade, a fifth-grade public-school teacher, is also a drug
dealer. In investigating this claim, police might want to obtain Slade’s
phone records to see if he has called known drug dealers, gang members, or
drug users. They might also seek access to his bank records to discover
whether the amount of money he deposits is consistent with his job as a
school teacher. Additionally, the police might like to find out from GPS
records and drone and camera feeds if Slade frequents areas of town where
drugs are routinely sold.
Under current Fourth Amendment and statutory law, none of these
policing moves requires a warrant or probable cause and, depending on the
jurisdiction, some of them may not even require a subpoena. That lack of
regulation is abetted by the Supreme Court’s assertion that expecting
privacy in information surrendered to a third party or in activities carried
out in public is unreasonable. 16 Yet most people surveyed on these matters
come to a quite different conclusion, ranking perusal of their bank and
phone records, for instance, as comparable to search of a bedroom, and
ranking location tracking as similar in invasiveness to a frisk. 17 On a more
philosophical plane, scholars argue that allowing the government to invade
databases so easily offends not only privacy, but autonomy and dignity. 18
16

See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414; United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983)
(no expectation of privacy in public).
17
See SLOBOGIN, supra note 4, at 112 tbl. (compare items 14 and 16), 184 tbl.
(compare items 24 and 25). This research has been replicated in Christine S. ScottHayward, Henry F. Fradella & Ryan G. Fischer, Does Privacy Require Secrecy?: Societal
Expectations of Privacy in the Digital Age, 43 AM. J. CRIM. L. 19 (2015); and Jeremy E.
Blumenthal, Meera Adya & Jacqueline Mogle, The Multiple Dimensions of Privacy:
Testing “Lay” Expectations of Privacy, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 331, 345 (2009).
18
See, e.g., David Lametti, The Cloud: Boundless Digital Potential or Enclosure
3.0?, 17 VA. J.L. & TECH. 190, 196 (2012) (“[W]e may be witnessing another round of
‘enclosure’ in Cloud space that might have serious deleterious effects on what we have
come to expect in the digital age: autonomy, exchange, spontaneity, and creativity, and all
at a lightning pace.”).
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They also claim it chills citizens’ rights to expression and association, and
creates huge potential for abuse; after all, knowledge—which The Cloud
provides in troves—is power. 19
The Supreme Court itself has begun to recognize these concerns. In
Riley v. California, 20 despite centuries-old precedent permitting
suspicionless searches of any item found on an arrested individual, it
required a warrant for a search of a cell phone of an arrestee, in recognition
of the fact that “the cell phone collects in one place many distinct types of
information—an address, a note, a prescription, a bank statement, a video—
that reveal much more in combination than any isolated record.” 21 In United
States v. Jones, 22 five members of the Court concluded that a Fourth
Amendment search occurs when the police engage in “prolonged” tracking
of a vehicle using GPS signals. While neither Riley nor Jones involved
database access, Justice Sotomayor may have summed up where the Court
is going when she stated in her concurring opinion in Jones that “it may be
necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.
This approach is ill-suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great
deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of
carrying out mundane tasks.” 23
On this view, government would not be foreclosed from perusing, at its
discretion, blogs, tweets, public records, and other sources that are clearly
meant to be consumed by the public. But it would prohibit police from
accessing, in the absence of justification, non-public Cloud data people
generate when they engage in “mundane tasks” like communicating with
their friends, banking, and shopping. It would also prohibit suspicionless
access to tracking data about everyday travels that the average person
undertakes on the assumption of practical anonymity.
In short, there is a strong case to be made for requiring the government
to demonstrate it has good reason to go after Cloud-based information about
a particular person that is not readily available in public fora. Then the
question becomes how good that reason must be. Normally, the Fourth
Amendment requires that a search be based on probable cause, which
amounts to a “fair probability” that a search will discover evidence of
19

See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and
Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1461 (2001) (“The problem
with databases is ... a problem that involves power and the effects of our relationship with
public and private bureaucracy—our inability to participate meaningfully in the collection
and use of our personal information.”).
20
134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
21
Id. at 2489.
22
565 U.S. 400 (2012).
23
Id. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).

6

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2947948

crime. 24 Return to the investigation of Slade. If the caller had identified
herself and provided detail about Slade’s drug deals, perhaps the police
would have had probable cause and grounds for a full-scale digital search.
But recall that, in fact, the caller was anonymous and simply said Slade was
selling drugs, thus making it difficult to dismiss the possibility that she was
a disgruntled student or a spurned lover. Under Supreme Court case law,
that call, by itself, would not permit a traditional search. 25
But suppose instead that the call, although anonymous, provides detail
about John’s next drug deal. While, by itself, this would not be enough for
probable cause, its predictive quality does provide an additional indication
of reliability. 26 In that intermediate situation, police arguably have
“reasonable suspicion” (a lesser level of cause but one that nonetheless
requires an articulable reason to act). 27 In that scenario, police might still be
prohibited from requisitioning the capacious digital record described above.
But perhaps they would be justified in seeking more limited transactional
data, say information about whether, near the predicted time, Slade calls a
particular number or heads toward a particular location.
This measured approach to accessing The Cloud is based on what
might be called the proportionality principle. 28 Under traditional Fourth
Amendment rules, an arrest requires probable cause, but a short detention
only reasonable suspicion; similarly, a full search of the person requires
probable cause, a frisk only reasonable suspicion. 29 Analogously,
significant invasions of privacy on The Cloud—obtaining a month’s worth
of bank records or Internet logs, or as the Supreme Court itself suggested in
Jones, travel records that track a person for four weeks 30—might require
cause about the target akin to that necessary to search a home or car.
However, less significant invasions—accessing records about a single
phone call, credit-card purchase, or car trip, pulling up an identity using
facial-recognition technology, or tracking a car for a few hours—could be
justifiable on something less. Not only does this type of proportionality
principle better reflect the degree of the government’s intrusion, it also
avoids the Catch-22 of requiring police to demonstrate probable cause
24

See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 2 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 114–15 (3d ed. 2007).
See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000) (holding unconstitutional a frisk based on
an anonymous phone call stating that the defendant would be standing on a street corner
wearing certain clothing with a gun on his person).
26
Cf. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (holding police had probable cause based
on an anonymous letter that provided considerable predictive detail, but only after some of
the detail was corroborated by police).
27
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
28
See SLOBOGIN, supra note 4, ch. 2.
29
See Terry, 392 U.S. at 20–27.
30
Jones, 565 U.S. at 403.
25
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before carrying out the preliminary investigative techniques they need to
develop it.
Proportionality reasoning makes sense in the abstract. But it presents
difficult line-drawing problems. What justification do police need if, rather
than seeking data about Slade’s financial transactions or travels over the
course of a month, they want only a week’s worth of data? Or if they want
to ascertain, in combination, whether Slade calls a particular number, visits
a particular location, and deposits a large amount of money during a given
month, but seek no other information about him?
Answers to these types of questions will inevitably produce somewhat
arbitrary classifications. Sometimes the answer might be categorical. That
was the angle the Supreme Court took with respect to searches of home
interiors carried out with sophisticated technology; in Kyllo v. United
States, the Court held that all such searches require probable cause. 31
Government access to Cloud data that is analogous to the interior of the
home—for instance, private documents stored on The Cloud, or
communications on a closed social network—should receive similar
categorical protection. 32
Once data leaves such confines, however, an across-the-board warrant
requirement for accessing personal information overprotects the interests at
stake, as both the Court’s cases and people’s views on the matter suggest. 33
One approach is to differentiate between types of information. Perhaps
medical records would receive the most protection, bank records something
less, utility records something less still. 34 Current federal law appears to
adopt this approach with respect to communications, with subscriber
information receiving minimal protection, phone numbers and e-mail
addresses receiving more protection, stored communications even more,
31

533 U.S. 27, 37–38 (2001) (involving thermal imaging of the home).
Some have argued that encrypted material should receive similar, or even absolute,
protection, simply by virtue of being encrypted. But given the fact that anything, including
impersonal business records, can be encrypted, proportionality reasoning would suggest
that the government should be able to force decryption of any material for which it has the
requisite cause. The encryption debate is too complicated to address in this limited space.
See Hugh J. McCarthy, Decoding the Decryption Debate: Why Legislating to Restrict
Strong Encryption Will Not Resolve the “Going Dark” Problem, 20 J. INTERNET L. 1
(2016) (detailing practical problems and domestic and international legal issues associated
with different approaches designed to permit government decryption).
33
See Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment,
75 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 335 (2008) (presenting survey data indicating significantly
different “intrusiveness ratings” depending on the type of record accessed).
34
For an effort in this vein, see AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY RECORDS (3d ed. 2013),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminal_justice_standards/thir
d_party_access.authcheckdam.pdf.
32
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and interception of communications requiring probable cause. 35 But the
intuition upon which this scheme is based is suspect: For instance, a
month’s worth of “metadata” about a person’s contacts may reveal much
more than the transcript of a conversation. 36 Similar comments can be made
about other types of data: Bank records, credit-card statements, and utility
logs can all be more or less private depending on the person and the context.
In these circumstances, an alternative or supplemental proportionality
approach might rely on durational or aggregational limitations. In Jones,
five members of the Court distinguished between “short-term” and
“prolonged” tracking. 37 Similarly, the Court has indicated that, while a
physical seizure lasting less than 15 minutes usually requires reasonable
suspicion, a longer seizure amounts to an arrest requiring probable cause, 38
and an arrest must be judicially reviewed within 48 hours. 39 One might limit
Cloud searches of non-public data outside the home context the same way,
on the theory that the more one learns about a person—from whatever
source—the more intrusion occurs. For instance, obtaining information
about the transactions of someone like Slade on a particular day or over a
couple of days might be permitted on a relevance showing, but seeking data
shadowing his activities over more than a 48-hour period or with respect to
several different days might require greater suspicion and a subpoena from
a judge, and obtaining a month’s worth of transactions could require
probable cause and a warrant. While this duration-based rule also has
administrability problems, 40 it has the benefit of simultaneously protecting
privacy in a roughly proportionate manner and permitting government to
build its case without requiring probable cause from the outset. Ultimately,
policymakers applying proportionality reasoning to suspect-driven Cloud
access might choose rules based on a combination of record-type and
aggregation considerations.
Even if one finds this type of reasoning persuasive in the abstract, it
might be resisted in the specific context of national-security investigations.
35

See supra notes 1–4 (citing relevant statutes).
See Steven M. Bellovin et al., It’s Too Complicated: How the Internet Upends
Katz, Smith, and Electronic Surveillance Law, 30 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1, 92 (2016) (given
technological developments, “[t]he concept of metadata as a category of information that is
wholly distinguishable from communications content and thus deserving of lower privacy
protection is no longer tenable”).
37
Jones, 565 U.S. at 430–31 (Alito, J., concurring).
38
See generally United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 684–88 (1985).
39
Cty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991).
40
Compare Orin Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L.
REV. 311 (2011) (describing some of the problems); with Christopher Slobogin, Making
the Most of United States v. Jones in a Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation of
Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 24–30 (2012) (providing a model
statute implementing mosaic theory).
36

9

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2947948

Where national security is at stake, the argument goes, any significant
limitation on Cloud usage should be jettisoned. But this stance should be
viewed with skepticism. “National security” is an extremely broad term,
and it has too often been a blank check for government abuse. 41 Concrete
threats to the country might justify departure from the rules that normally
govern domestic law enforcement; for instance, if there is a demonstrable,
significant, and imminent danger, relaxation of the justification required by
proportionality reasoning might be permissible in this context. But
otherwise the National Security Agency and like government entities should
probably be treated no differently than other law enforcement agencies.
II. PROFILE-DRIVEN CLOUD ACCESS-HIT RATES
Profile-driven searches are very similar to suspect-driven searches.
The difference is that suspect-driven searches start with a person thought to
be engaged in wrongdoing and then go to The Cloud, while with profiledriven searches the government has no particular suspect when it seeks out
Cloud data; rather it utilizes a profile describing the characteristics of likely
perpetrators that it hopes will identify wrongdoers. Again using John Slade
as an example, imagine that the police focus on him not because of an
anonymous tip but because of a drug-dealer profile developed with the help
of computer scientists and criminologists. Such a profile might be
composed, let’s say, of five factors having to do with travel, spending, and
communication patterns. Or, similar to how credit-card companies identify
theft and fraud, the profile might purport to tell police when and where a
drug deal is occurring or is soon likely to occur, which allows them to
conduct surveillance of that spot and perhaps nab a perpetrator. Analogous
to how researchers have developed risk-assessment instruments for pretrial
detention and sentencing purposes, 42 these profiles would initially be based
on analysis of drug-dealer characteristics and behavior, and then crossvalidated on new populations or locations.
Profiling using data accumulated from Cloud-related sources,
sometimes called “predictive policing,” is in its infancy. But police
departments appear to be committed to developing the necessary tools. 43
41

See generally Erik K. Yamamoto, White (House) Lies: Why the Public Must
Compel the Courts to Hold the President Accountable for National Security Abuses, 68
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 285 (2005).
42
See e.g., Christopher T. Lowenkamp & Jay Whetzel, The Development of an
Actuarial Risk Assessment Instrument for U.S. Pretrial Services, 73 FED. PROBATION 33
(Sept. 2009).
43
See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163
U. PA. L. REV. 327, 352–88 (2015); Jeffrey Fagan, “Race and the New Policing,” in the
present Report.
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Such profiles are only useful, of course, if the government has access to
databases that have the information needed to run the profile. Whether it
should have such access is discussed below (under program-driven Cloud
searches). Assume for now the data is available to government officials.
As with suspect-driven Cloud searches, the analysis of profile-driven
Cloud inquiries should involve determining whether the justification is
proportional to the intrusion. In other words, the profile must produce a “hit
rate” equivalent to the certainty required by the proportionality principle. If
one equates probable cause with approximately a 50% hit rate, a profile that
correctly identifies a drug dealer only 20% of the time would not authorize
use of a profile that accesses multiple intimate data sources. But it might
justify use of a profile that relies on arrest records, gang member lists, and
other public or quasi-public data.
Achieving even a 20% rate may be impossible for most crime
scenarios, however; certainly social scientists engaged in the analogous
pursuit of predicting dangerousness for sentencing purposes have struggled
to achieve such accuracy. There are scores of variables associated with
criminal behavior, and the prognostic power of any given variable or
combination of variables is likely to be very low. Further, profiles will
probably need to be updated routinely, either because of naturally occurring
changes in criminal behavior or because perpetrators get wind of the factors
in the profile. When one adds to those challenges the fact that much of the
information about individuals found on The Cloud is unreliable, 44 profiles
that might justify apprehending specific suspects will be few and far
between, at least if police action based on such data abides by the
proportionality principle.
Assuming that profiles with acceptable hit rates can nonetheless be
developed, a second limitation on profile-driven Cloud use is that it should
be transparent. To avoid profiles concocted after the fact, allow perusal of
hit-rate data, and ensure that those individuals who are targeted using a
profile actually meet it, profiles must be accessible to courts and other
oversight entities, at least on an in camera basis (i.e., in chambers, outside
the presence of the public). Transparency also assures that the factors on
which profilers rely are vetted to ensure that illegitimate ones, such as those
that are racially discriminatory, are not influencing the results.
This vetting process could become difficult if, as occurs in some
commercial contexts, profiles rely on complex algorithms generated
through opaque machine-learning techniques or protected from disclosure
for proprietary reasons. 45 Complicating matters further, risk factors such as
44

See Ferguson, supra note 43, at 398–99.
See Michael L. Rich, Machine Learning, Automated Algorithms, and the Fourth
Amendment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 871, 883–86 (2016).
45
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criminal history, location, and employment may turn out to be proxies for
race, class, and related traits, use of which are generally considered
anathema in police work. 46
These concerns do not have to be paralyzing, however. For instance,
profiles that are indecipherable could be banned in the law enforcement
context, regardless of their accuracy, 47 or can be designed to ensure
“procedural regularity.” 48 Steps can also be taken to alleviate the concern
that some risk factors correlate with race as well as crime. For instance,
developers of algorithms designed to detect potential hot spots or
perpetrators could be directed to avoid arrest records for low-level or drug
crimes that might reflect race-based policing practices; instead, developers
can be told to rely on reports of crimes (for hot-spot profiles) and on crimes
of violence or on property crimes (for suspect profiles), so as to reduce the
influence of racially-discriminatory arrest rates for drug crimes and
similarly bias-susceptible offenses. 49 It is also important to remember that
traditional policing often relies on the same suspect, static factors, in ways
that are inevitably more intuitive, and therefore less discoverable and more
subject to invidious manipulation. Transparent algorithms that can produce
the relevant hit rates and that avoid obviously illegitimate variables are very
likely to be an improvement. 50
To limit further the extent to which bias creeps into the process,
however, a third limitation that should be imposed on profile-driven Cloud
searches is the maxim that everyone who fits a given profile must be treated
the same. That means if a drug-dealer profile with the relevant hit rate
46

See Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CAL. L.
REV. 671 (2016). For discussions of race and policing, see David A. Harris, “Racial
Profiling,” in the present Report; and Devon W. Carbado, “Race and the Fourth
Amendment,” in the present Report.
47
See Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, Regulating Inscrutable Systems (2017)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) (identifying increasingly difficult-tointerpret approaches to algorithms, beginning with “decision tree” logic and ending with
“deep learning” artificial intelligence).
48
See Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633 (2017)
(sketching how computer programs can be constructed to ensure fairness and procedural
regularity despite the black box nature of machine learning).
49
Cf. Michael Feldman et al., Certifying and Removing Disparate Impact,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 21ST ACM SIGKDD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON KNOWLEDGE
DISCOVERY AND DATA MINING 259 (2015) (discussing similar moves in connection with
hiring algorithms).
50
See, e.g., Sharad Goel et al., Combatting Police Discrimination in the Age of Big
Data, 20 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 181 (2017) (using stop and frisk data from New York City to
create a risk profile that predicted who would be carrying a weapon 83% of the time; also
finding that factors like “furtive movement,” a common police justification for stops, was
not related to weapon possession and that, of those stopped using the profile, whites were
much more likely than blacks to have a weapon).
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identifies 200 people, police should not be able simply to single out
someone like Slade but rather would either have to investigate everyone
who fits the profile or, if that is not feasible, select individuals on a neutral,
pre-specified basis (e.g., every third person). In the absence of this
limitation, attempts to avoid illegitimate discrimination in construction of
the profile will merely reappear at the post-profile investigation stage.
The added advantage of this third limitation on profile-driven actions
is that it would make law enforcement think twice before engaging in them.
Profile-driven searches will produce a large number of false positives, no
matter how good they are. If, for instance, the predicted hit rate is 50%, half
of those investigated are likely to be innocent, whether the police go after
everyone identified by the algorithm or only a neutrally selected subgroup.
Even if the post-profile police work is covert, much investigative energy
will be expended with no gain. And in those situations where the
investigation of those who meet the profile involves overt searching or
seizing, a non-trivial number of false positives are likely to complain.
Although the quantified, objective nature of profile-driven Cloud searches
offers many advantages over traditional suspect-based techniques, their
dragnet nature may end up being so practically or politically unpalatable
when used to identify “persons of interest” that police abandon them.
III. EVENT-DRIVEN CLOUD ACCESS-HASSLE RATES
Some Cloud searches conducted by law enforcement start not with a
suspect or a profile of a likely suspect, but with an event—usually a
crime—and use Cloud data to try to figure out who perpetrated or witnessed
it. Let’s return to the example of John Slade, but this time as a victim rather
than a potential suspect. Imagine that at 2 a.m. one Sunday morning, police
are called to the scene of a homicide, a dark urban street, where they find
Slade dead, drugs strewn around him. A medical examiner says the death
probably occurred two hours earlier, around midnight. Pre-Cloud, the police
would probably go door to door talking to those who live in the immediate
vicinity, some or all of whom might claim—honestly or not—to have been
elsewhere at the relevant time or to have seen or heard nothing. In contrast,
today police might access phone or vehicle GPS records, as well as feeds
from surveillance cameras with face-recognition or night-vision capacity, to
identify people or cars near the crime scene at the time it happened, and
then use suspect-driven techniques to zero in on the perpetrator. 51
51

Baltimore has used videos from plane cameras to “TiVo” backward from the scene
of the crime to determine how individuals and vehicles got there. See Monte Reel, Secret
Cameras Record Baltimore’s Every Move from Above, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Aug.
23, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-baltimore-secret-surveillance/.
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These event-driven uses of The Cloud could result in a large haul of
people, among whom may be the perpetrator or a witness, but many of
whom will be neither. At the same time, all that this “data dump” learns
about any of these individuals is that they were near a particular place at a
particular time, a discovery that proportionality reasoning would suggest
requires little justification. Even so, the scope of the government’s Cloud
inquiry should probably be limited, to reduce both the extent of the initial
privacy invasion and the number of people subject to further law
enforcement inquiry. In other words, the government should minimize what
Jane Bambauer calls the “hassle rate”—the proportion of innocent people
subject to police investigation in an effort to find the one or two bad
people. 52
What that rate should be will depend on the likely number of people
involved. In effect, an admonition to limit hassle rates is simply a call to
shape event-driven searches around the relevant time and place. In
investigating Slade’s death, for instance, police should be able to find out
the identity of and question pedestrians and car drivers near the scene of the
crime shortly before or after midnight (assuming the medical examiner’s
assessment is correct). But perhaps the police should not be able to
investigate people who never approached the scene closer than 50 yards or
who were there before 11:30 p.m. or after 12:30 a.m.
The Cloud facilitates immensely the ability of investigators to carry out
event-driven inquiries. Such inquiries can be quite broad, limited only by
the imagination and priorities of law enforcement (because they are not
limited by current law, at least in most jurisdictions). In contrast to the hit
rates required for profile-driven Cloud searches, acceptable hassle rates for
event-driven Cloud searches are not easy to establish, and should probably
vary with the type of information sought and the type of crime being
investigated. 53 If the law is called into play here, perhaps the best that can
be done is to require police to seek authorization for such inquiries from a
judge, who can take potential hassle rates and these other factors into
account in determining whether and to what extent event-driven Cloud
searches may occur.

52

Jane Bambauer, Hassle, 113 MICH. L. REV. 461 (2015).
In an analogous situation, the Supreme Court held that the analysis should consider
“the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure
advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty.”
Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 427 (2004) (upholding a roadblock at the time of day and
the place of a hit-and-run accident committed one week earlier, set up to find possible
witnesses).
53
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IV. PROGRAM-DRIVEN CLOUD ACCESS-DEMOCRATIC AUTHORIZATION
Suspect-driven, profile-driven, and event-driven Cloud searches all rely
in varying degrees on access to multiple databases, ranging from those that
keep track of communications and travels to those that house records of
financial and social transactions. From law enforcement’s perspective,
keeping these databases within their separate silos is, at the least, inefficient
and, in the case of profile-driven Cloud access, perhaps fatal, since profiles
usually only work when they can access several databases at once. It was in
recognition of this fact that the Defense Department proposed, post-9/11,
the Total Information Awareness (TIA) program. According to a chart
prepared by the Department of Defense, TIA was meant to gather in one
place a huge array of transaction information concerning, according to the
official description, “financial, educational, medical, veterinary[!], entry
[i.e., immigration and customs], transportation, housing, ... and
communications” activities, as well as all government records. 54 Once
collected, these data would be combed using algorithms designed to detect
terrorist activity. Congress, apparently not enamored of this idea, defunded
TIA in 2003 (by voice vote). 55 But if Edward Snowden is to be believed,
several programs in operation today, run by the NSA or other government
agencies, bear at least some resemblance to it. 56
As the public reaction to Snowden’s revelations indicates, a significant
proportion of the citizenry is uncomfortable with these types of programs.
Compilation of information from multiple sources in one “place” raises a
host of concerns. As recent exposés of foreign machinations highlight,
aggregation of data facilitates hacking and identity theft. 57 It also leads to
“mission creep,” as law enforcement realizes that information obtained for
one reason (such as fighting terrorism) might be useful for other purposes. It
can easily lead to more obvious abuses, ranging from illegitimate
investigations of journalists, politicians, activists, and members of certain

54

See
Total
Information
Awareness,
WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_Information_Awareness (last updated July 14, 2017)
(depicting a chart purporting to have been prepared by the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency).
55
See 149 Cong. Rec. S1379-02, S1416 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 2003).
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See Glenn Greenwald, XKeyscore: NSA Tool Collects “Nearly Everything a User
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ethnic groups to leaks based on personal vendettas. 58 Most prominently, it
tempts the government to combine all of the information it has collected to
create “personality mosaics” or “digital dossiers” about each of its citizens,
a phenomenon classically associated with totalitarian states. 59
In part because of the public reaction to Snowden’s disclosures, the
NSA supposedly no longer collects metadata and must now seek it through
subpoenas from the relevant common carriers, in the suspect- and profiledriven manner described earlier. 60 But the NSA and other federal agencies
continue to aggregate other types of data. 61 Localities and states also engage
in the data-collection enterprise. For instance, New York City’s Domain
Awareness system, co-created by the city’s police department and
Microsoft, collates information gleaned from thousands of closed-circuit
surveillance cameras (CCTV), and combines it with geospatial data that
reveals crime “hot spots,” feeds from license-recognition systems, and GPS
signals that permit real-time and historical tracking of cars. 62 A number of
other cities operate large-scale CCTV systems, and many are also moving
toward 24/7 drone or plane surveillance. 63 A different type of program,
known as a “fusion center,” exists in more than half the states. These
centers—over 75 at last count, some with more than 200 personnel—“fuse”
financial, rental, utility, vehicular, and communications data from federal,
state, and local public databases, law enforcement files, and private
company records for investigative purposes. 64
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For some examples involving activists, journalists, members of minority groups
and so on, see Robert H. Sloan & Richard Warner, The Self, the Stasi, and the NSA:
Privacy, Knowledge, and Complicity in the Surveillance State, 17 MINN. J.L. SCI. TECH.
347, 347–80 (2016).
59
Daniel Solove popularized the term “digital dossiers,” which he described as the
aggregation of data to create “a profile of an individual’s finances, health, psychology,
beliefs, politics, interests, and lifestyle” that “increasingly flows from the private sector to
the government, particularly for law enforcement use.” Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers
and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1084 (2004).
60
USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 101, 129 Stat. 268, 269-71
(2015).
61
Zack Whittaker, Freedom Act Will Kill Only One of NSA’s Programs (and Not
Even One of Its Worst), ZERO DAY (May 4, 2014), http://www.zdnet. com/article/ freedomact-metadata-phone-records-prism/#!.
62
See Colleen Long, NYPD, Microsoft Create Crime-Fighting “Domain Awareness”
Tech System, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 25, 2013).
63
See Somini Sengupta, Privacy Fears Grow as Cities Increase Surveillance, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 13, 2013); Marc J. Blitz et al., Regulating Drones under the First and Fourth
Amendments, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49 (2015).
64
See THE CONST. PROJECT, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUSION CENTERS: PRESERVING
PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES WHILE PROTECTING AGAINST CRIME AND TERRORISM 4
(2012), www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/fusioncenterreport.
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These program-driven efforts, which have been called “panvasive”
because they invade the records of large swaths of the population, occur
with the foreknowledge that most of those affected have done nothing
wrong. 65 Thus, this collection of data cannot be regulated through
suspicion-based proportionality reasoning. Arguably, however, it does not
need to be. Until the data are accessed by humans and used as a means of
investigating or identifying particular people like Slade, no concrete
intrusion has occurred. Only when such access does occur will government
officials need to demonstrate the cause necessary to carry out suspect-,
profile-, or event-driven searches.
For those who do not trust government to abide by such strictures, one
further protection, illustrated by Congress’ changes to the NSA’s metadata
program, would be to require that all databases be maintained outside the
government. Even profile-driven Cloud searches could be carried out by a
private entity, with the government providing the profile and the company
providing the government only with the identities of those who meet it.
While this arrangement would still present some of the problems associated
with aggregation (hacking and the like), it would undoubtedly reduce the
potential for mischief by government officials.
In the end, however, this attempt to separate government from data
cannot work. Many of the databases useful to Cloud searches—those that
house CCTV feeds, the data from highway tracking systems, and the
billions of personal records relevant to criminal history, taxes, entitlements,
real-estate transactions, and scores of other matters—would not exist but for
the government. The executive branch needs this information for all sorts of
legitimate reasons, some related to crime prevention and many that are not.
Government should not be prohibited from collecting and maintaining it.
Instead, regulation of program-driven Cloud searches must come from
the political process. 66 Given Congress’ docility toward executive-branch
surveillance proposals after 9/11, that suggestion may seem naïve. But
legislatures are capable of action in this area, as the defunding of TIA and
the revamping of the NSA’s metadata program illustrate. 67 Especially when,
as is the case with many types of Cloud-based efforts, the program affects
significant segments of the population—including members of the

65
See Christopher Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, Political Process Theory, and
the Nondelegation Doctrine, 102 GEO. L.J. 1721 (2014).
66
Id. at 1745–58.
67
Other examples are state statutes that limit the use of drone surveillance and federal
statutes limiting access to various types of records. See Michael L. Smith, Regulating Law
Enforcement’s Use of Drones: The Need for State Legislation, 52 HARV. J. LEGIS. 423,
427–32 (2015) (cataloguing state drone statutes); Murphy, supra note 5, at 546 (appendix
detailing federal laws).
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legislature and their most powerful constituents—some type of political
oversight is not only possible but likely.
At the same time, it must be admitted that law enforcement and toughon-crime lobbies are a forceful presence at both the federal and state levels
and may be able to exert influence that the populace as a whole cannot. That
is where the courts could come into play, in two ways. On rare occasions,
courts might declare a particular data-collection scheme unconstitutional
under the Fourth Amendment. However, given the Supreme Court’s narrow
definition of the word “search” for Fourth Amendment purposes and its
high level of deference even to programs that it is willing to say involve
searches (under what it calls its “special needs” jurisprudence 68), that
outcome is not likely in the near future.
A second way courts might nudge legislatures and law enforcement
agencies toward a balanced view—and one that would operate
independently of the Fourth Amendment—is by applying the same “hard
look” analysis they apply to programs created by other administrative
agencies like the Environmental Protection Agency and the Food and Drug
Administration. 69 While law enforcement departments have seldom been
subject to the type of judicial monitoring to which other agencies routinely
submit, that lack of oversight is likely a historical accident rather than a
considered policy. The full argument for why courts are obligated to engage
in such oversight will not be set out here. 70 For present purposes, it suffices
to say that, where program-driven, panvasive operations are involved, a
solid case can be made that the courts should treat police agencies the same
way they treat other agencies that are engaged in creating rules governing
the circumstances under which people may carry out innocent conduct.
That conclusion has several consequences. First, under accepted
administrative law principles, no agency program that affects the rights and
obligations of the citizenry may exist unless the agency can point to
authorizing legislation that, ideally, sets out the harm to be prevented, the
persons and activities likely to be affected, and the general means for
preventing the harm. That would mean that before programs like New York
City’s Domain Awareness operation and the states’ fusion centers can come
into being, municipal, state, or federal legislatures would have to think
through the types of information they can obtain and for what purpose. That
68
For a description of this jurisprudence, see Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, supra
note 65, at 1727–33.
69
See, e.g., Patrick M. Garry, Judicial Review and the “Hard Look” Doctrine, 7 NEV.
L.J. 151, 154–59 (2006) (discussing the Administrative Procedure Act and associated case
law establishing the hard look doctrine).
70
See Christopher Slobogin, Policing as Administration, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 91
(2016); see also Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, “Democratic Accountability and
Policing,” in the present Report.
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requirement of legislative authorization, enforced by the courts, would
ensure at least some democratic assessment of such programs and how they
should operate.
The impact of administrative law principles would not end there,
however. Standard practice dictates that, once authorized to set up a
program, an agency must draft implementing rules, subject them to a noticeand-comment process (or something similar) that allows public input, and
provide written rationales for the rules ultimately chosen—rules that are
reviewable by a court to ensure they are consistent with the legislative
delegation and that they are applied even-handedly, without irrational
distinctions between groups or areas. 71 This further injection of democratic
input and judicial oversight would exert significantly more pressure on
police departments to consider competing views when contemplating the
creation of a data-collection scheme. Regulated through this type of public
process, it is likely that TIA-like programs, fusion centers, and other
panvasive practices would be significantly curtailed or implemented with
more care.
The even-handedness requirement, designed to prevent biased data
collection, is particularly important, so important that some have argued it
should also be enforced through equal protection doctrine. 72 It would call
either for universal or random data collection (as suggested above in
connection with profiles) or for proof that uneven information collection is
justified statistically. For instance, this principle might demand that CCTV
camera systems be established citywide or, alternatively, everywhere within
the city that has similar reported crime rates. Metadata collection would be
nationwide, random, or based on algorithms with high hit rates. And DNA
database programs focused on arrestees, like the one authorized by the
Supreme Court, 73 would be hard to justify without some proof that arrestees
are significantly more likely to commit crimes than the general
population. 74
One possible drawback to the political-process approach to programdriven Cloud searches is that its transparent nature will enable the bad guys
to learn the ins-and-outs of the programs and how to avoid them. But this
traditional law enforcement concern, which administrative procedure acts
specifically recognize as legitimate, 75 is exaggerated in this setting. The
71

Slobogin, Policing as Administration, supra note 70, at 144–45.
Barry Friedman & Cynthia B. Stein, Redefining What’s “Reasonable”: The
Protections for Policing, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 281, 327–43 (2016).
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Maryland v. King, 567 U.S. 1301 (2012).
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Andrea Roth, Maryland v. King and the Wonderful, Horrible DNA Revolution in
Law Enforcement, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 295, 308–09 (2013) (explaining the virtues of a
universal DNA database).
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See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E) (2012).
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primary aim of most panvasive actions is deterrence, which publicity can
only enhance. Further, matters of specific implementation need not be
revealed. For instance, if camera surveillance is meant to be covert, the fact
and general area of such surveillance should be disclosed, but exact camera
locations need not be. The types of records sought by fusion centers should
be revealed, but the algorithms that might be used to analyze them could be
viewed in camera. Ultimately, however, the primary response to the tip-off
concern is that democratic accountability requires that the public be told not
only what panvasive capacities police have but how those capacities will be
used.
V. VOLUNTEER-DRIVEN CLOUD SEATCHES-FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS
All of the foregoing Cloud searches involve government-initiated
investigations. The assumption throughout this paper has been that when the
government decides to intrude, some justification is necessary. But what if a
data-holder—a bank, a common carrier, or hospital—comes across
information it thinks is indicative of criminal activity and wants to hand it
over to the police? While the discussion thus far has suggested several
reasons why government should not be able to demand information from a
third party without justification, the situation is clearly different when the
third party comes forward of its own accord.
Even so, it is important to recognize that not all volunteer-driven Cloud
searches are alike. In the cases in which the Supreme Court first announced
the third-party doctrine, the third party was a personal acquaintance of the
defendant. 76 Establishing a rule that the government must ignore disclosures
from such people denigrates their autonomous choice to make the
disclosures, and could even be said to undermine their First Amendment
right to speech. Recall, for instance, the tipster in the hypothetical involving
John Slade. Whatever that person’s motives and however that person
acquired the information, the choice to divulge it deserves respect and
should be considered a legitimate basis for government action if it has
sufficient indications of reliability.
However, in the Court’s later third-party cases, Miller v. United
States 77 and Smith v. Maryland, 78 the third party was not a person but an
institution, more specifically, a bank and a phone company. Historically,
corporations have not been considered autonomous “persons” in most
contexts and have also been accorded lesser First Amendment rights than
76

See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966); Hoffa v. United States, 385
U.S. 293 (1966).
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425 U.S. 435 (1976).
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442 U.S. 735 (1979).
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natural beings. 79 More importantly, unlike human confidantes, these
institutions can be said to owe either formal or quasi-formal fiduciary duties
to their customers, because unlike the human third party, they are able to
obtain personal facts solely because they purport to provide a particular
service. 80 The most sympathetic example on point comes from the medical
context, where a patient provides information to a treatment provider. Even
the Supreme Court has balked at the notion that a hospital is entitled to
ignore a patient’s expectation of medical privacy for the purpose of catching
criminals. 81 Arguably, an analogous position is warranted with respect to
banks and phone companies, to which we give information for the sole
purpose of carrying out financial transactions or communicating.
Also important to recognize is that, when the third party is an
institution, the degree to which information is “voluntarily” handed over to
the government can vary greatly. In some cases, the government commands
third parties to produce information about others, automatically and in the
absence of a particularized court order. For instance, banks must report all
deposits of $10,000, regardless of circumstances. 82 If this sort of command
is justifiable, it should be so only if it comes from the legislature and is
generally applicable (as is true in the deposit scenario). More commonly,
the government exerts subtler pressures on third parties to produce
information. Most obviously, some data brokers, although purportedly
private and independent of the government, essentially see the government
as their client, 83 and other companies, dependent on government largesse,
may be especially eager to show they are helpful. 84 Unless defined
narrowly, volunteer-driven Cloud searches might ultimately even undo
79

The Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Fed. Elec. Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310
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efforts, like the recent NSA legislation, to keep as much data as possible out
of government hands. That phenomenon is worrisome, because people
should be able to trust that the private institutions on which they depend for
the basics of life are not conduits to the government.
At the same time, it must be acknowledged that fiduciary obligations
and concerns about corporate duplicity should not always trump speech
rights and concerns about public safety. For instance, both the medical and
legal professions recognize a duty to reveal information that would prevent
a violent crime or forestall an ongoing one. 85 Explicitly applied to The
Cloud, that norm would permit third-party institutions to disclose, and
government to use, information about others that is likely to prevent a
serious violent felony from taking place in the near future. Arguably,
however, that norm should be the full extent to which the law bows to the
volunteer notion where third-party institutions that are essential to living in
the modern world are involved. 86
RECOMMENDATIONS
Databases are full of information that can enhance law enforcement’s
ability to detect and investigate crime and terrorism. Given the personal
nature of much of this information, however, government should not be able
to obtain, view, or use it at will. The following recommendations
concerning law enforcement access to data arise out of the foregoing
discussion.
1. If a policing agency seeks non-public records about an identified
person, it should have to demonstrate suspicion of wrongdoing
proportionate to the intrusion involved. Whether or not courts
modify current Fourth Amendment law to encompass such access,
legislatures and agencies should require increasingly demanding
justification requirements based on the nature of the data sought, the
amount of data sought, or a combination thereof.
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MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (“A lawyer may reveal
information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably
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2. If a law enforcement agency is instead accessing data for the
purpose of executing a profile to identify suspects, it should
ensure the profile produces the requisite proportionality-derived
hit rate, avoids illegitimate discrimination, and uses an
understandable algorithm. Courts should evaluate these profiles,
in camera if necessary, to ensure they are properly validated and do
not rely on obviously biased risk factors. If the profile is used to
identify suspects, police should not be able to choose whom among
them will be subject to further investigation, but rather should be
required to investigate all of those who meet the profile or, if that is
not possible, a neutrally selected subset of that group.
3. If policing agencies are relying on a crime rather than a suspect
or a profile as the starting point of the investigation, the crime
should be serious and the number of people investigated kept to
the minimum dictated by the time and place of the crime. At
least when the investigation is extensive, judges should be involved
in evaluating the need for and scope of such investigations.
4. Collections of data needed by law enforcement should be
maintained outside of government to the extent consistent with
governing needs, but wherever maintained they should be
authorized by specific legislation and administrative rules
transparently and democratically arrived at. Data-acquisition
methods should be universal, random, or statistically justifiable.
Courts should enforce these rules through either the administrative
hard-look doctrine or equal protection analysis.
5. Private institutions should be permitted to proffer to the
government information about those to whom they owe a de
facto fiduciary duty only when they have good reason to believe
it would prevent an ongoing or future serious violent felony.
Courts should scrutinize any government incentives, financial or
otherwise, that encourage the transfer of information that normally
would be subject to the foregoing access and collection limitations.
These rules, accompanied by adequate accountability mechanisms that
facilitate discovery of and sanctions for their breach, 87 would allow the
government to take advantage of The Cloud’s investigative potential while
cabining the temptation to abuse it.
87

Such mechanisms might include: (1) an auditing process indicating who accesses
data, when, and for what purpose; (2) notice, either individualized (in the case of suspectdriven searches) or general (in other cases), detailing how Cloud access has occurred; (3)
rules limiting data retention by the government or third parties; and (4) civil and criminal
sanctions for wrongful collection or access. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 4, at 132-36.
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